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Goal 3 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is specifi cally aimed at reducing gender inequalities. In order to put this recommendation into practice, policy makers need to understand whether diff erences in labor outcomes stem from diff erences in individual characteristics or diff erences in the returns to these characteristics. Diff erent sets of policies are called for in each case.
Th e literature on gender gaps confi rms the presence of gender inequalities for both wage-earners and self-employed workers. In Guinea, diff erences in individual characteristics account for only 45 percent of the gender gap in earnings from self-employment and 25 percent of the diff erences in earnings from public sector employment; in the private sector, women earn more than men (Glick and Sahn 1997) . fi nd gender inequality in the public sector of Tanzania; they fi nd no evidence of gender discrimination in Kenya's labor market. Glewwe (1990) fi nds no wage discrimination against women in Ghana. On the contrary, women in the public sector seem to earn more than men. 2 Siphambe and Th okweng-Bakwena (2001) show that in the public sector of Botswana, most of the wage gap refl ects diff erences in individual characteristics between men and women rather than discrimination. In contrast, most of the wage gap in the private sector refl ects discrimination. fi nd evidence that the public sector of Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda practices less wage discrimination than the private sector. Nordman and Roubaud (2009) fi nd a similar result for Madagascar, where a gender gap in the public sector favors women.
Th e magnitude of gender wage gaps in the public and private sectors varies across countries. However, the main reason for this diversity may be in the heterogeneity of the data sources used by diff erent authors (labor force or household surveys undertaken for purposes other than studying the labor market), in the period they consider, and in the methodology they implement.
Concerning the ethnic wage gap, the literature is even scarcer. Barr and Oduro (2000) fi nd that standard observed diff erences in workers' characteristics explain much of the earnings diff erentials across ethnic groups in Ghana. Th e role of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in development has received much more attention. Easterly and Levine (1997) conclude that "Africa's growth tragedy" is in part related to its high level of ethnic diversity, resulting in poor institutional functioning.
Th is chapter casts light on these issues by using the set of 1-2-3 surveys conducted in the capital cities of the seven French-speaking countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) (for a description of these surveys, see box O.1 in the overview). Th is approach is important for two reasons. First, the data used were collected using the same sampling method and virtually identical questionnaires in each city in the same period of time , making for totally comparable results. Second, the chapter analyzes both gender and ethnic gap issues using the same methodological approach for each city.
Th e chapter is organized as follows. Th e fi rst section discusses the data, concepts, and econometric methods used. Th e second section analyzes the results. Th e last section summarizes the main fi ndings and draws conclusions.
Data, Concepts, and Methodology
Th is section presents the data and concepts used. It then discusses the methodology of earnings decompositions, an essential aspect of the investigation.
Data and Concepts
Th e data are taken from Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys conducted in the seven French-speaking capitals of the WAEMU countries. Th e sample surveyed in Phase 1 included 93,213 individuals (17,841 households). All respondents were asked about their ethnic group. Th e nonresponse rate was very low, with just 665 respondents failing to identify their ethnic group.
When restricted to working individuals with nonzero earnings, on whom our estimations are based, the sample size is reduced to 20,878 observations (table 9.1), with a minimum of 2,294 observations in Niamey and a maximum of 3,575 observations in Dakar. Th is sample is still large enough to allow disaggregation of the data by sector (public sector, formal private sector, and informal sector) and gender.
Th e number of ethnic groups listed in the questionnaire ranged from 9 in Benin and Niger to 40 in Togo. In order to harmonize the data and the number of categories considered, we collapsed the 40 Togolese groups and 18 Ivorian groups into 6 groups.
Wage Gap Decomposition Techniques
Traditional gender earnings decompositions rely on estimations of Mincer-type earnings functions for men and women of the form
where lnw i is the natural logarithm of the observed hourly earnings for individual i; x i is a vector of observed individual characteristics; a is a vector of coeffi cients; and ε i is a disturbance term with an expected value of zero. Earnings functions are fi rst estimated separately for men and women and for the diff erent sectors. Th ere is no universally accepted set of conditioning variables that should be included in describing the causes of gender diff erentials, although the consensus seems to be that controls for productivity-related factors such as education, labor market experience, and marital status should be included. It is debatable whether job characteristics, occupation, and industry should be taken into account: if employers diff erentiate between men and women by tending to hire into certain occupations, then occupational assignment is an outcome of employer practices rather than an outcome of individual choice or productivity diff erences. It was not possible to account for workers' actual experience in the labor market; potential experience, which can be viewed as refl ecting the "gross" time individuals have spent while in the labor force (measured as age minus years of schooling minus six, the legal age at school entry), was therefore used. Use of potential rather than actual experience represents a possible limitation of the study, because diff erences in labor force attachment by gender are important in explaining the size of the gender wage gap. Indeed, measures of women's work experience are particularly prone to errors given the discontinuity of women's labor market participation (women oft en leave the labor force to bear and raise children, for instance). Using proxy measures such as potential experience may thus overestimate experience for women; it may be a good approximation of experience for men with greater labor force attachment (Nordman and Roubaud 2009). 4 Concerns arise over possible sample selection biases in the estimations. One source is the fact that earnings are observed only when people work, and not everyone is working. Th e second source is the selective decision to work in the public sector rather than the private or informal sectors.
We address both issues using Lee's two-stage approach to take account of the possible eff ect of endogenous paid-work participation and sector allocation on earnings (Lee 1983) . 5 In the fi rst stage, multinomial logit models of individual i's participation for pay in sector j are used to compute the correction terms k ij from the predicted probabilities P ij . Th e sectors considered in the multinomial logit are the public sector, the formal private sector, and the informal sector. Th e reference category includes all other working-age individuals (inactive, unemployed, and unpaid workers) .
A potential problem is that the multinomial logit may suff er from the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption, which in most cases is questionable. Hausman-type tests (Hausman and McFadden 1984) for each city and sector provide massive evidence that the IIA assumption is not violated, except in the informal sector of Bamako. In Lee's procedure, identifi cation is achieved by including additional individual variables in the fi rst-stage selection equations that are omitted in the second-stage earnings regressions: a set of dummies indicating relationship to the household head, the dependency ratio (number of non-working-age individuals divided by the total number of individuals in the household), and the household size. 6 We assume that these variables do not infl uence earnings.
Oaxaca and Neumark's traditional earnings decompositions. Th e most common approach to identifying sources of gender wage gaps is the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (based on the seminal work of Oaxaca 1973 and Blinder 1973) . In this approach, two separate standard Mincerian log earnings equations are estimated for men and women:
where w m and w f are the means of earnings by men and by women; x m and x f are vectors containing the means of the independent variables for men and women; and a m and a f are the estimated coeffi cients. Th e fi rst term on the right-hand side captures the earnings diff erential caused by diff erences in the individual characteristics of men and women. Th e second term is the earnings gap attributable to diff erent returns to those characteristics or coeffi cients. It can be argued that, under discrimination, men are paid competitive wages and women are underpaid. If this is the case, the coeffi cients for men should be taken as the nondiscriminatory wage structure, as in equation (9.2). Conversely, if employers pay women competitive wages but pay men more, then the women's coeffi cients should be used as the nondiscriminatory wage structure. Th e issue is thus how to determine the wage structure a* that would prevail in the absence of discrimination. Th is choice poses the well-known index number problem. A priori neither appears preferable, but the decomposition can be quite sensitive to the selection made. Th e literature proposes diff erent weighting schemes to deal with the underlying index problem (Neumark 1988) . We rely on the general decomposition proposed by Neumark, which can be written as follows:
Th is decomposition can be reduced to Oaxaca's two special cases if it is assumed that there is no discrimination in the wage structure for men (that is, a * = a m ) or for women (a * = a f ). Neumark shows that a * can be estimated using the weighted average of the wage structures of men and women and advocates using the pooled sample to estimate a * . Th e fi rst term is the gender wage gap attributable to diff erences in individual characteristics. Th e second and third terms capture the diff erence between the actual and pooled returns for men and women.
Earnings decompositions with sample selectivity. Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) show that sample selection complicates the interpretation of earnings decompositions. Th ey off er several alternative decompositions, each based on diff erent assumptions and objectives. We use one of them that considers selectivity as a separate component. Th is technique has the advantage of not calling for any prior hypothesis regarding the links between individual characteristics and selectivity. An additional term in the decomposition measures the contribution of selection eff ects to the observed gender earnings gap, q m l  m − q f l  f , where l  and q denote the mean correction term (generalized Mills ratio) and its estimated coeffi cient from each regression by gender. Hence, in the full sectoral decomposition that follows, when trying to account for sample selectivity, we consider the decomposition of off ered instead of actual earnings (that is, earnings net of the selection eff ects ql  ) (see Reimers 1983) .
Full sectoral decomposition. Although the improvement proposed by Neumark's decomposition is attractive, it is not immune from criticisms of decomposition methods in general. One of them is that without evidence that employers care only about the proportion of each type of labor employed, it is not clear that the pooled coeffi cient is a good estimator of the nondiscriminatory wage structure. Th e full sectoral decomposition of takes into account diff erences in sectoral structures by gender by using an approach similar to Neumark's and decomposing the gender earnings gap into three components.
Let W -m and W -f be the means of the natural logs of men's and women's earnings and p mj and p fj the sample proportions of men and women in sector j. Earnings can be written as the sum of sectoral earnings weighted by the proportion of workers in each sector:
One can decompose the diff erence in mean earnings into intrasectoral earnings diff erences and diff erences in proportions employed in the diff erent sectors. In order to overcome the index problem, assume the sectoral structure that would prevail in the absence of gender diff erences in the impact of individual characteristics on sectoral choice.
Let p * j be the proportion of workers in sector j under this assumption. Appleton, Hoddinott, and Krishnan decompose the diff erence in mean earnings as follows: Th e fi rst term can be decomposed using the Neumark decomposition presented earlier. Th e second and third terms can be decomposed further, in order to distinguish diff erences arising from diff erences in individual characteristics from diff erences arising from diff erences in returns to these characteristics. One can derive the average probability of being employed in a given sector for men and women from the estimation of pooled and separate multinomial logit models for each gender. Th ese mean probabilities are denoted by p * mj and p * fj .
Embedding the self-selection process in equation (9.6) allows the full decomposition to be written as follows: Th e fi rst three terms are similar to Neumark's decompositions of withinsector earnings gaps. Th e fourth and fi fth terms measure the diff erence in earnings caused by diff erences in the distribution of men and women in diff erent sectors. Th e last two terms account for diff erences in earnings resulting from the deviations between predicted and actual sectoral compositions of men and women not accounted for by diff erences in individual characteristics.
Earnings gap decomposition for ethnic groups. Extending decomposition methods developed and traditionally used to analyze possible discrimination against women to the study of earnings diff erentials between ethnic groups is not straightforward. One of the main problems is related to the defi nition and measurement of ethnicity: what defi nes an ethnic group? In developed countries, there exist confl icting views and diff erent traditions regarding the collection of data on ethnic origin. Anglo-Saxon societies are accustomed to measuring and analyzing data on so-called racial and ethnic groups; many other countries refuse to categorize individuals using ethnic or racial criteria and, as a result, do not collect statistical data on ethnic origin.
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In Africa, the notion of ethnicity also raises a number of questions that social scientists have debated extensively (Bayart 1989) . Anthropologists have shown that ethnic groups are not characterized by genetic homogeneity. Depending on countries and contexts, the constitution of ethnic groups appears to be more or less recent and their defi nition malleable. Some groups have their origin in a common myth or ancestor; others share only a language and culture. Some "ethnic groups" have been constructed by other groups, following migration, invasion, or colonization.
Th ese various origins notwithstanding, ethnicity plays an important role in social relations in many African countries. Th ere is, for instance, strong evidence of high levels of endogamy (marriage within a specifi c group, as required by custom or law), not only in rural areas, where ethnic homogeneity is oft en observed, but also in urban areas, where diff erent ethnic groups cohabit. In recent years, economists have examined the importance of ethnicity to development and growth. Th e seminal paper is the study by Easterly and Levine (1997) , who conclude that "Africa's growth tragedy" is in part related to its high level of ethnic diversity, which results in poor institutional functioning. Th is conclusion remains a subject of debate (see Bossuroy 2007 for a discussion).
Th is chapter focuses on the impact of ethnicity on labor market outcomes measured through earnings. To apply the methods developed for the analysis of the gender earnings gap, one is inclined to construct a dichotomous variable identifying either a possibly favored or discriminated-against ethnic group. Data collection on ethnicity at the household or individual level is common in Africa: most household and employment surveys include a variable indicating ethnic group. However, given the diversity of national contexts, two diffi culties arise. Th e fi rst is related to identifying a priori a discriminated-against ethnic group. Should one consider the majority ethnic group as favored? Or should one consider instead the group to which the head of state belongs? Th e second diffi culty arises because of our comparative framework. How does belonging to diff erent groups compare across countries? For instance, is being a Mossi in Ouagadougou (77 percent of the population) comparable to being a Bambara in Bamako (34 percent of the population). We consider various aspects of possible ethnic discrimination on urban labor markets while keeping in mind the diff erent national contexts.
Results
We now turn to the presentation and analysis of results obtained using the different approaches presented above.
Neumark Decomposition of Gender and Ethnic Earnings Gaps
Th is section analyzes gender and ethnic earnings gaps using traditional decomposition approaches. We identify the largest ethnic group in each city (table 9.2). Th ese groups represent a majority of the population in three of seven cities (Cotonou, Lomé, and Ouagadougou; see the annex for details).
In six of the seven cities, the largest ethnic group corresponds to the majority group at the national level. Th e sole exception is Niamey, where the Djerma are the largest ethnic group but the Haoussa represent 54 percent of the population of Niger. Figure 9 .1 reports two Herfi ndhal concentration indices for ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) in each country.
8 Th e fi rst is computed at the national level; the second is computed for the seven cities, using the 1-2-3 survey data. Levels are similar across all countries except Burkina Faso, where the ELF index appears to be much lower in the capital than at the country level. Th is diff erence stems from the fact that the ethnic majority group (Mossi) represents 78 percent of the population in Ouagadougou and only 50 percent at the national level. Table 9 .3 reports the decomposition of earnings gaps based on Neumark's approach. A number of results are worth emphasizing. Raw gender earnings gaps are large and signifi cant, and they range widely across cities (from 50.0 in Niamey to 79.2 in Abidjan). Th ese fi gures indicate that, on average, women's earnings in Abidjan are 20.8 percent of men's earnings. Raw gender earnings gaps are positive by construction, because they are computed as the diff erence between a "high group" and a "low group. " In the sample of countries, women always correspond to the low group. In contrast, the largest ethnic group corresponds to the high group in Abidjan, Dakar, and Niamey and to the low group in Bamako, Cotonou, Lomé, and Ouagadougou. Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 9 .1 for details). * significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
Gender diff erences in the distribution of individual characteristics related to productivity-such as education and experience-explain less than half of the raw gender gap in six of the seven cities. Lomé is an exception, with diff erences in individual characteristics explaining almost 55 percent of the gap. Including variables related to the type of occupation decreases somewhat the unexplained share of the raw gender gap. Th is decrease appears to be substantial in Abidjan, Lomé, and Ouagadougou.
Men are systematically favored over women in all cities in the sample. In contrast, the largest ethnic groups do not appear to have a systematically favorable position in the urban labor markets. Only in Abidjan and Dakar is the gap both signifi cant and favorable for the largest ethnic group (in Abidjan, the Akan earn 28 percent more than other ethnic groups; in Dakar, the Wolof earn 7 percent more than other ethnic groups). In Bamako, Lomé, and Ouagadougou, members of the largest ethnic group earn signifi cantly less than members of other ethnic groups. In Ouagadougou, lower average earnings by the Mossi could be related to their spatial distribution: they represent 78 percent of the population of the capital city but just 50 percent of the population of Burkina Faso. It could be that only better-performing non-Mossi migrate to the capital.
Th e decomposition of ethnic earnings gaps reveals markedly diff erent results across cities. In Abidjan, diff erences in the distribution of individual characteristics explain more than 85 percent of the gap, leaving little room for discrimination (the unexplained share). In Bamako, the unexplained share of the gap is 43 percent (39 percent once occupational and sector dummies are included in the regressions). In Dakar, 100 percent of the gap is left unexplained until job characteristics related to occupation and sector are introduced. In Ouagadougou, where the majority ethnic group (Mossi) earns less than other groups, the gap is also in large part explained by diff erences in the distribution of individual characteristics, such as education and experience; just 20 percent of the diff erential is unexplained.
Full Decomposition of Gender Earnings Gap
Th ere are at least four types of labor markets in most developing countries: rural (or agricultural), public, formal private, and informal. Each of these markets has its own characteristics, such as job seasonality, uncertainty of demand, the nature of contracts, and the structure of wages and earnings. As a result, gender and ethnic labor allocation across these sectors can be expected to contribute to earnings gaps.
Following and Nordman and Roubaud (2009), we provide comparable estimates of the size and determinants of gender earnings gaps using the full decomposition method described previously. Given that we are analyzing urban labor markets, only three types of labor markets are examined: public, formal private, and informal. Th e results are reported without (table 9.4) and with (table 9.5) correction for selectivity of participation and sectoral allocation. Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 9 .1 for details). Note: The raw earnings gap is defined as log(men's earnings) -log(women's earnings). * significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
14.5
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 9 .1 for details). Note: The earnings gap is defined as log(men's earnings) -log(women's earnings). Decomposition is based on observed earnings. * significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
Within-sector diff erences in earnings account for the largest share of the gender gap, with contributions ranging from 60 percent in Abidjan to 75 percent in Cotonou. Th e remaining diff erence can be attributed to gender diff erences in the proportions of workers in each sector. Th e positive sum of these three terms for all cities implies that the diff erences in sectoral locations favor men. For instance, the gender earnings gap would have been 40 percent smaller in Abidjan if men and women had been equally distributed across the three sectors, because fewer women work in the higher-paying sectors.
Diff erences attributable to individual characteristics account for a relatively small share of within-sector diff erences in earnings, ranging from 10 percent in Dakar to 41 percent in Lomé (not shown in the table). Diff erences attributable to individual characteristics account for a very large share of the sectoral location diff erences between men and women, ranging from 65 percent in Dakar to 85 percent in Bamako and Cotonou.
Diff erences attributable to diff erences in the returns of men and women are of the same order of magnitude, indicating that both "discrimination" against women and "nepotism" in favor of men contribute to the gender earnings gap. Both factors also contribute to diff erences in sectoral location but at a much lower level.
Taking into account selectivity leads to analyzing the decomposition not of actual earnings but of off ered earnings, computed using the coeffi cients of the selection term in the earnings equations. Th e results in table 9.5 show that off ered earnings gaps are much higher in Cotonou, Bamako, and Dakar and lower in the other cities. Higher earnings gaps when sectoral selectivity is accounted for are not systematically associated with a larger contribution of sectoral location diff erences, however; except in Niamey, within-sector earnings diff erences remain the main contributor to gender gaps.
Ethnic Earnings Diff erentials
Concerning ethnic earnings gaps, the results in table 9.6 (without correcting for selectivity) indicate that the contribution of sectoral location to explaining the gap varies markedly between cities. In Abidjan, diff erences in sectoral location explain 86 percent of the gap, of which 75 percent is accounted for by diff erences in individual characteristics. In Bamako, within-sector diff erences in earnings account for 77 percent of the earnings gap, of which 33 percent is attributable to diff erences in individual characteristics; both nepotism (16 percent) and discrimination (28 percent) signifi cantly contribute to the gap through their contribution to within-sector diff erences in earnings. In Ouagadougou, the gap can be attributed almost evenly to diff erences in sectoral location (53 percent) and within-sector earnings (47 percent).
Sectoral location diff erences are almost entirely explained by diff erences in individual characteristics. In Lomé, in contrast to Bamako, the deviation in the eff ect of individual characteristics on location explains a large share of sectoral location diff erences. In contrast to the results obtained for gender, where Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 9 .1 for details). Note: The earnings gap is defined as log(majority group earnings) -log(minority group earnings). Decomposition is based on observed earnings. * significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
sectoral location systematically increases the gap in favor of men, in some cities sectoral location plays a compensating role in observed earnings gaps. Taking selectivity into account changes some measures of the gaps (table 9.7). Th e gap decreases in Abidjan, Dakar, and Ouagadougou and increases in Bamako. In Lomé, the gap is actually reversed, possibly indicating that on average the off ered earnings of the largest ethnic group are higher than they are for other ethnic groups. Th is puzzling result requires further investigation (for instance, in order to understand the features of earnings negotiations, one would need to know the ethnic group of the employer).
Th e largest number of ethnic groups is in Bamako and Ouagadougou (10), followed by Dakar (9); Lomé and Niamey (7); and Abidjan and Cotonou (6) (table 9A.2). Table 9 .8 reports the coeffi cients of the dummies indicating each ethnic group in regressions of city-level earnings equations. In the fi rst column, ethnic group dummies are the only regressors. A set of usual controls is introduced in the specifi cation reported in the second column (table 9.9 reports the coeffi cients for these variables).
Two results are evident from these regressions. First, there is at least one signifi cant coeffi cient on ethnic dummies in all cities, indicating diff erences in average earnings of diff erent ethnic groups.
10 Second, most of these diff erences diminish-and in some cases vanish-once other individual characteristics are controlled for. Overall, dominant ethnic groups do not seem to be favored on the labor market once one controls for productivity-related individual characteristics. On the contrary, in Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali, some nondominant groups have higher earnings than the dominant group aft er controlling for other factors. Moreover, none of the favored groups seems to be related to the ethnicity of the head of state at the time of the survey.
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Conclusion
Th e fi ndings in this chapter are important for two main reasons. First, international comparisons of earnings gaps are still rare in Africa. Th e 1-2-3 surveys used here rely on identical methodologies and virtually identical questionnaires in each city, making for totally comparable results.
Second, we address the issue of sample selectivity associated with endogenous sector choices, because gender and ethnic labor allocation between these sectors can be expected to contribute to earnings gaps. Following , we then provide comparable estimates of the size and determinants of gender and ethnic earnings gaps using decomposition methods that address the sectoral allocation issue.
Th e results show that gender earnings gaps are large in all seven cities in our sample and that gender diff erences in the distribution of individual characteristics usually explain less than half of the raw gender gap. In contrast, dominant Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 9 .1 for details). Note: The earnings gap is defined as log(majority group earnings) -log(minority group earnings). Decomposition is based on observed earnings. * significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 9 .1 for details). Note: n.a. = Not applicable. * significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. ethnic groups do not appear to have a systematically favorable position in the urban labor markets in our sample, and observed gaps are small relative to gender gaps. Moreover, "favored" minority groups do not seem to be related to the ethnicity of the head of state at the time of the survey. Whatever the sign of the gap, the contribution of diff erences in the distribution of individual characteristics varies markedly across cities. Taking into account diff erences in sectoral locations in the decomposition of gender earnings gaps provides evidence that within-sector diff erences in earnings account for the largest share of the gender gap and that diff erences in sectoral locations are always more favorable to men than to women. In contrast, full decomposition of ethnic earnings gaps indicates that sectoral location sometimes plays a "compensating" role. Looking at fi ner levels of ethnic disaggregation confi rms that ethnic earnings diff erentials are systematically smaller than gender diff erentials. diff erences in access to capital and the low productivity of activities engaged in by self-employed women may explain this fi nding. 10. In some cities, the groups considered represent very small shares of the population (see annex table 9A.2) . For this reason, we did not implement decomposition methods at this level of ethnic disaggregation. 11. Data on the ethnicity of the head of state at the time of the survey are provided in the data set put together by Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin (2007) .
Annex: Ethnicity in Seven West African Countries
